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THE RIGHT TO FOREGO
LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT:
LEGAL TRENDS AND EMERGING
ISSUES
KAREN R. ROTHENBERG
Universtty of Maryland

•'From the day they enter medical school, physicians are Laught t.o cherish
and preserve life. However, there comes a time with the terminally iU or
irreversible comatose patient that the physician must step back and, at the
patient's or the family's request, allow the patient to die with dignity." [I)

In 1988 more than three out of four physicians surveyed
favored ''withdrawing life support systems, including food and
water, from hopelessly ill or irreversibly comotose patients if
they or their families request it.'' [2] Over 90% believed that
physicians should initiate discussions with patients and their
families on the use of withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.
Yet more than half of these physi'cians were either uncertain or
unsure of the legal risks and responsibilities surrounding
decisions to withdraw life-sustaining treatment.
The ''right-to-die'' movement has come a long way since the
Quinlan [3] case captured our attention just a decade ago. At
that time, both the public and the medical establishment waited
anxiously as the court ruled in a case previously reserved to
whispering in hospital corridors and discussions among medical
ethicists. During the same year, California enacted the first
Natural Death Act, granting statutory recognition to the ''living
will." [4]
In the last twelve years, the courts and the state legislatures,
together with health care professionals, hospitals, medical
ethicists, legal scholars, and the public have continued to
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address the legal and ethical issues raised by foregoing lifesustaining treatment. Progress has been made in opening up
debate and reaching consensus on many of the issues. Clear
legal trends have emerged, yet questions still remain.
This article will first discuss the legal and ethical foundations
that support the right to forego life-sustaining treatment. This
right will then be applied to the competent patient. The greater
challenge for the law, which _will then be analyzed, is how to
preserve such a right for the incompetent patient. [5) The
article will conclude by highlighting unresolved issues and new
questions for further debate.

THE RIGHT TO FOREGO TREATMENT: FOUNDATIONS
It is now widely accepted by both the medical and legal
community-as well as the public at large-that there exists a
right to forego treatment. Both the common law right to selldetermination and bodily integrity and the constitutional right
to privacy provide the legal foundation for this right.
''No right is held more sacred or is more carefully guarded by
the common law than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraints
or interference by others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law. •' [6} This common law right is recognized in
both criminal and tort law. A bodily invasion without consent
constitutes a battery or trespass. Beginning in the 1960s, the
courts expanded their recognition of self-determination in the
medical context to the development of the doctrine of informed
consent. This tort doctrine provides that the health care
provider has a duty to inform the patient of alternatives and
risks to treatment prior to obtaining valid consent. Informed
consent has evolved to where the right not to consent-or forego
treatment-has been incorporated into the doctrine. Otherwise,
the right to self-determination would not be fully realized.
As the law of informed consent evolved, the New Jersey
Supreme Court in the Quinlan [7] case established another
legal source for upholding the right to forego life-sustaining
treatment: the constitutional right to privacy. Although the
constitution does not explicitly mention a right to privacy, the
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Quinlan court reasoned that, if the U.S. Supreme Court
recognized such a right to protect the individual from state
action which would limit such personal choices as contraception
and a woman's decision to terminate pregnancy under certain
conditions [B), the right to privacy would also be broad enough
to encompass a· patient's decision to decline medical treatment.
[9] The Quinlan court determined that a patient in a persistent
vegetative state, with no reasonable chance of recovery, had the
right to have the respirator sustaining her life withdrawn. Since
_she was incompetent to express her wishes, her quardian and
family would act on her behalf to exercise her right to forego
further life-sustaining treatment.
The court did recognize that the right was not absolute and
would have to be balanced against the claimed interests of the
state in the ''preservation of life and defense of the right of the
physician to administer medical care according to his best
judgment." [10} As more state courts faced such cases, four
state interests emerged: (1) the preservation of life; (2) the
prevention of suicide; (3) protection of minor children; and (4}
protection of the ethical integrity of the medical profession. [11}
The most important state interest, at least in theory, is the
preservation of life. In practice, it is now clear that this interest
would not outweigh the right of a patient to refuse
life-sustaining treatment. Suicide prevention is generally not an
issue in right to die caseg because the patient does not inflict the
illness deliberately on himself. If the patient has no minor
children or the family consents, the third interest is usually not
at issue. Finally, the ethical standards of the medical profession
have evolved since Quinlan to a point where the profession
supports the right of the patient to refuse treatment.
The United States Supreme Court has yet to hear a case
involving the right to forego treatment but, as noted above, the
New Jersey court's interpretation of the constitutional right to
privacy should extend to recognition of such a right. [12] In the
meantime, the right has evolved in most states and federal
courts to a point where it is protected by both the common law
and the constitutional right to privacy. Both of these legal
sources provide the legal foundation for promoting the values of
self-determination, bodily integrity. and personal autonomy in
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medical decision-making.
To a large extent, the development of law in this area has
been influenced by the evolution of medical ethics. In the early
1980s, an influential series of reports were released by the
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical· Problems in
Medicine and Behavioral Research, including one entitled
"Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment." {13} It
became clear from the report and the judicial decisions that
followed that there was no clear ethical nor legal distinction in
this area between withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining
treatment. The right to forego treatment would include both the
withdrawing and withholding of treatment.
Physicians and health care institutions believed-and many
still do- that the act of withdrawing a respirator or removing a
feeding tube is an affirmative act that hastens death. [141 Once
such treatment is initiated, it must be continued, regardless of
its value to the patient. On the other hand, the withholding of
· such treatment is ethically and legally permissible.
In fact, it is often more difficult to know how a patient will
respond to a treatment without a time-limited trial. This is
particularly true for the emergency patient. Accordingly, it may
be contrary to medical standards to avoid placing a patient on a
respirator or inserting a feeding tube merely because of the
incorrect belief that such procedures could not be terminated.
As the New Jersey court noted in the Conroy case [15J, such a
•
distinction could in fact discourage families and physicians from
even attempting certain types of care and thereby force them
into hasty and premature decisions to allow a patient to die. To
date, only the State of Ohio has suggested that different procedures are required for withdrawing and withholding
treatment and only the Mississippi living will statute authorizes
withdrawal of treatment explicitly, but nowhere expressly
provides for withholding treatment. [16]
For the competent patient, it should be relatively easy to
exercise the right to have treatment withheld or withdrawn. The
patient decides and communicates his decision to the health
care provider. For the patient without such capacity, the
exercise of such a right is more problematic. It is the application
of the right for the competent patient that will now be
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addressed.

THE COMPETENT PATIENT
All patients are presumed to be competent. Legally, only a
court has the authority to declare a person ''incompetent.'' In
practice, a patient is competent or, more correctly, has the
capacity to make treatment decisions when he can understand
the relevant information, reflect on it according with his values
and goals, and communicate with caregivers.· [17] Most often
this determination is not a problem. If the patient is unconscious
or severely retarded, for example, he is clearly incapable of
making a decision. The problem becomes more difficult when
fear, mental illness or physical illness cloud the patient's
judgment. In practice, if a patient is incapacitated by a condition
that is temporary (i.e., severe pain, intoxication, withdrawal)
any determination on competency and treatment decisions
should be postponed, if at all possible.
Very few cases deal with defining capacity to consent to or
refuse treatment, although most states have procedures for a
court to make a finding of legal competency. Generally, the
courts are wary about second-guessing the choice of a patient.
Even if a patient's refusal to be treated seems irrational to the
physician, this does not mean that the patient is incompetent. A
patient may be depressed, have periods of confusion and a
distorted sense of time but, if capable of understa:Q.ding the
consequences of the decision to refuse treatment, the court will
not declare the patient incompetent. (18] A diagnosed mental
illness or even commitment to a mental institution, per se, does
not mean that a patient is not competent to refuse treatment if
he understands the consequences of the decision. [19]
Although the reasonableness of the decision to refuse treatment
is not the standard for competency, in practice the nature of the
treatment and the prognosis may influence whether the health
care provider takes the issue to court and whether the court
deems the patient incompetent. [20]
In most cases, the determination of competency is not at issue
and a number of recent court decisions have affirmed the
patient's right to refuse treatment regardless of prognosis. [21]
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Consistent with the value underlying informed consent, the
health care provider is to honor the refusal of the patient. The
California court held that an incurable, but not terminally ill
patient, had a right to withdraw from a respirator even if such
action would hasten his death. To do otherwise ·would be to
frustrate the very essence of the right of informed consent and
the constitutional right to privacy. {22] In the much-publicized
Bouvia case [23], the same court held that a quadriplegic, who
was not terminally ill, had the right to order the withdrawal of a
nasogastric feeding tube even if such action would hasten or
cause her death. The court determined that such a decision was
neither medical nor legal, but hers alone to make. Most recently
the New Jersey Supreme Court declared that a competent
woman, with an incurable neurological disease but in which
death was not imminent, had the right to have a respirator
removed at home. [24) The court recognized that her life was
filled with pain and that it would be unfair and unjust to force
· her to live any longer.

THE INCOMPETENT PATIENT
Most of the ''right-to-die'' cases in the last decade have not
involved a competent patient. Not surprisingly the doctrine of
the right of the competent
informed consent has protected
,,
patient to refuse treatment and this has been accepted by both
the medical and legal communities. The challenge has been in
defining the parameters of the right of the patient incapable of
making his own treatment decisions. Although state courts
decide each case on a unique set of facts and state laws vary,
certain trends do emerge on the two major issues at stake: (1)
what decision-making criteria should be applied when exercising the right of the incompetent patient to forego life-sustaining treatment? and (2) who should be making such decisions?
Decision-making Criteria
At this point it is appropriate to return to the case of Karen
Quinlan, a young adult in a persistent vegetative state. In 1975
her father first petitioned a New Jersey court to be appointed
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her guardian for permission to withdraw her from a respirator.
No request was made to remove her feeding tube. Her attending
physicians and the hospital would not remove the respirator
because they deemed it contrary to medical, ethical, and legal
standards. They feared the potential of both criminal and civil
liability.
Ultimately, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided that
Karen, if competent, could have exercised her constitutional
right of privacy to refuse what appeared at the time to be lifesustaining treatment. [25] This right which outweighed any
state interest would be lost if it could not be exercised by
another on her behalf. The court set out the following balancing
test: ''the state interests contra weakens and the individuar s
right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases
and the prognosis dims.'' [26] Her treatment was sufficiently
invasive and her condition and profnosis sufficiently dim as to
allow life-sustaining treatment to be terminated. If Karen's
guardian, family, and attending physicians concurred and an
"ethics committee" [27] confirmed no reasonable possibility
that she might recover to a sapient state, the respirator could be
withdrawn and all parties would be immune from civil and
criminal liability.
Since the Quinlan case, most state courts have considered
cases involving vegetative state. A few cases have involved the
chronically ill who may lack decision-making capacity because of
senility but are not facing life-threatening conditions and are not
unconscious. [28] A few more cases have dealt with the
mentally retarded or the "never competent" patient. [29] From
these cases have emerged decision-making criteria for the
termination of treatment for the incompetent patient.
Decision-making criteria set standards for determining what
the incompetent patient would have decided if capable of
communicating his own decision. This is commonly referred to
as ''substituted judgment,'' an approach adopted by most of the
jurisdictions that have addressed the issue. Such an approach
requires the surrogate decision-maker to act in accordance with
explicit directives, values, and preferences of the p~tient.
Although this may be a difficult task, most jurisdictions cling to
this approach as the best way to preserve the right to self-
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determination for the incompetent patient.
Courts attach great significance to evidence of prior wishes of
the patient while competent. The best evidence of a patient's
wishes is the signing of an advanced directive in which the
patient, while competent, expresses his wishes with respect to
life-sustaining treatment if he becomes incompetent. Thirtyeight states and the District of Columbia have now enacted
natura) death, living will or . death-with-dignity statutes that
grant statutory recognition to such advanced directives. Even in
those states without such statutes, the courts have viewed the
existence of such a directive as strong evidence of the patient's
wishes~

Typically, living will statutes provide for refusing life-sustaining treatment when the patient's condition becomes
"terminal" and/or death is "imminent." Statutes take varied
approaches to defining what constitutes "life-sustaining"
treatment. Some statutes specifically include artificial feeding
· and hydration and others specifically omit such procedures. All
statutes provide for detailed procedures for executing the
advanced directive and many include a model form to be filled
out by the person when competent. Perhaps. most significantly,
all statutes provide immunity for health care providers who act
in good faith to comply with a properly executed living will. [30]
The enactment of a living will statute may be more symbolic
than either necessary or effective in guaranteeing the right to
refuse treatment to the incompetent patient. As noted above, it
does not cover the patient in a persistent vegetatiVe state such
as Karen Quinlan. Furthermore, many of the statutes are
ambiguous in their language about which "life-sustaining"
treatments may be withheld or withdrawn-most notably
artificial food and hydration and antibiotics.
On a positive note, they do codify the state's recognitionwith or without a state court ruling-of the right of the patient to
terminate treatment over the state's interest in preserving life.
Immunity for health care providers from civil and criminal
liability should also encourage more dialogue between patients
and providers over long-term treatment plans. [31]
In any case, the living will does not represent the exclusive
vehicle for exercising the right to forego treatment. Another
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statutory alternative gaining much popularity is the Durable
Power of Attorney (DPA). All states and the District of
Columbia have statutes which enable a competent person to
appoint a proxy decision-maker when the individual is no longer
competent to make decisions. Most of these statutes were not
passed to deal specifically with medical decision-making but
rather with financial matters. Yet, in a recent case, the New
Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the right of a proxy, appointed
while a persistent vegetative patient was still competent, to act
on her behalf to have the nursing home provider remove her
nasogflstric feeding tube. [32]
A number of states have recently amended their general DPA
statutes or passed new statutes which specifically provide for a
proxy to make medical decisions. Any competent person may
appoint a proxy to act on his behalf once he is declared
incapable of making his medical decisions. A proxy may have
the power to: provide, withhold or withdraw consent to specific
medical procedures, including CPR, antibiotics, artificial
feeding and hydration, and blood transfusions; interpret a living
will and resort to courts, if necessary, to obtain court authorization regarding treatment decisions or to request civil damages
for not honoring the proxy's decision. [33]
Since most patients do not leave explicit instructions nor
execute advanced directives [341, the next best evidence
available may consist of conversations with family, friends, and
physicians. A patient's personal beliefs, values, religious
principles, and even consistent attitudes about past medical
care may be of some relevance when attempting to evaluate how
the patient would weigh the benefits and burdens of lifesustaining treatment.
If there is no reliable evidence, the surrogate may apply the
''best interests'' test. This is the traditional guardianship
standard in which the surrogate objectively weighs the benefits
and burdens of treatment to determine how a reasonable person
in the patient's circumstances would promote his well-being.
{35] Under no circumstance is the social worth of the patient to
enter into the formulation. This is particularly critical when the
patient is mentally retarded and institutionalized.
Although a presumption for treatment may exist, the court
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has recognized that it is not always in a patient's best interests
to continue life-sustaining treatment. [36] Recently, ethical
guidelines have emerged for applying the "best interests"
standard to important categories of patients.
For the patient who is terminally ill, the major considerations
are whether foregoing treatment will allow the patient to avoid
the burden of prolonged dying with pain or suffering and
whether the patient has the potential benefit of achieving some
satisfaction if he survives for a longer period. [37]
For the patient with a severe illness or disabling condition
that is irreversible, the major consideration is whether termination of treatment would be preferable to a patient's life largely
devoid of opportunities to achieve satisfaction or full of pain or
suffering with no corresponding benefits. [38]
For a patient with irreversible loss of consciousness, the
benefit/burden analysis is different. Such patients do not
experience pain. The only possible benefit to them of treatment
is that the diagnosis is wrong and they will regain consciousness. Thus, the major considerations are whether a reasonable
person in the patient's circumstances would find that this
benefit, as well as the benefit to the family and friends, (i.e.,
satisfaction in caring for the patient and meaningfulness of
continued survival) is outweighed by the emotional suffering
and financial burden of treatment. [39J
The· evolution of ethiCal standards has, also influenced the
legal parameters of defining ''life-sustaining treatment.''
Historically, the courts adhered to a distinction between extraordinary and ordinary care. A patient or his surrogate could
refuse those treatments and procedures labeled extaordinary,
but not those that were deemed ordinary. In the Quinlan case, in
fact, the mechanical respirator was labeled as an extraordinary
treatment.
Within the last few years, the focus has shifted to the withholding or withdrawal of artificial feeding and hydration.
Adopting the position of the President's Commission, the courts
have either expanded the definition of extraordinary to include
such treatment or have abandoned the distinction as unhelpful
and confusing altogether. [40] The courts have also been
influenced by the AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs

(490)

JHHRA

SPRING

1989

which issued a major opinion in 1986 that it is ethically permissible to withhold all life-prolonging treatment, including
artificial nutrition and hydration, from permanently unconscious
or dying patients in accordance with their wishes or those of
their surrogates. [41]
To date courts in over 13 states have ruled that the right to
refusal is no different for artificial feeding and hydration than
for other forms of medical treatment. The position of the New
Jersey Supreme Court in the Conroy case . has since been
adopted by a number of other state courts. "Analytically,
artificial feeding by means of a nasogastric tube or intravenous
infusion can be seen as equivalent to artificial breathing by
means of a respirator, Both prolong life through mechanical
means when the body is no longer able to perform a vital bodily
function on its own." [421
Although the common law has moved forward in this area,
there is still much confusion on this issue. Ironically, part of the
confusion is based on the living will statutes. Six states clearly
do indicate that an advanced directive can provide for the withdrawal of artificial feeding not necessary for comfort care. Seven
others explicitly exclude it as a procedure that may be rejected.
A number of other statutes provide that food and water may not
be rejected, but do not specificially define artificial feeding and
hydration. Other statutes make no mention of the issue at all.
{43] In spite of this confusion. at least three state courts
(Florida, Maine, and Californi~) tha~ have addressed the issue
have held that restrictive statutes cannot be read to limit the
constitutional and common law rights of patients to have artificial feeding tubes withdrawn. [44]
Another life-sustaining treatment or procedure worthy of
particular attention is emergency resuscitation for cardiac arrest
and pulmonary failure (CPR). Traditionally, many hospitals
would act as if there was a Do Not Resuscitate Order (DNR) for a
hopelessly ill patient, but would not document it in the chart.
The decision whether to resuscitate was often not discussed
with the patient and/or his surrogate, but rather handled as a
medical decision that was within the discretion of the attending
physician. A number of state medical societies, the New York
State legislature, and the Joint Commission for the Accreditation
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of Hospitals (JCAH) have recently addressed this issue.
If a hopelessly ill patient is competent, the emerging standard
is that the patient should decide on whether a DNR order should
be made, based on the patient's understanding of medical
diagnosis and prognosis. In other words, the DNR order should
be treated like all other medical decisions in which the patient
has the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. {45] If the
patient is not competent, the. decision should be reached by
consultation between physician and family members or the legal
guardian. Once a decision is made, it should be documented in
the nredical record. Any significant improvement would void the
order. [46)

Who Should Decide?
Decision-making criteria enable the surrogate decision-maker
to exercise the incompetent patient's right to forego life. sustaining treatment. To accomplish this role best, guidelines
have evolved over who this surrogate decision-maker should be.
Traditionally, the physician relied on the family to assist in
making medical decisions for the incompetent patient. Such
a medical custom makes sense, given the family's unique relationship with the patient. As the Quinlan court noted, the family
has knowledge of and concern for the welfare of the family
member. Of course, it is possible that family members may have
different values and may oe unable to separate financial or
emotional concerns from decision-making. But, absent a
showing of bad faith or a physician's belief that the family does
not have the welfare of the patient at stake, the family should be
the primary decision-maker.
Until very recently, the only way to ensure that the physician
or institution would not be subject to civil or criminal liability for
relying on a family member to consent to withdrawing or withholding treatment was to go to court either to have a family
member appointed as a guardian or to obtain judicial approval
of the decision itslef. [47] A clear consensus has emerged that
going to court is too burdensome, too expensive, and inappropriate in most cases since the court is ill-equipped to make such
personal and complex ethical decisions. In recent years, at least
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half of the states, either by court opinion or statute, have
explicitly authorized the family of adult patients to authorize
termination of treatment without going to court. [48]
Two years ago, the New Jersey Supreme Court set out comprehensive guidelines for family decision-making. [49] The
court declared the family as the primary decision-maker in spite
of the fact that New Jersey had no statute on point. With
concurrence by the attending physician and confirmation of the
medical condition by two independent physicians, the family
without a court order had the right to have treatment refused on
behalf of the incompetent patient. There need _not be clear and
convincing evidence of what the patient would have wanted, but
rather the family is to do the best they can under the circumstances to make good faith decisions based on their knowledge
of the family member. [50]
State statutes also provide recognition of the family as
primary decision-maker without court intervention. The
"substituted judgment" statute provides a priority list of
persons the provider is to tum to for consent to treatment.
Statutes vary as to the conditions in which the surrogate may
also authorize the termination of life-sustaining treatment.
Informed consent and living will statutes may also be a source of
authority for the family surrogate to request termination of lifesustaining treatment. [51] A durable power of attorney may
also specify a family member (or friend) as the proxy for
decisions.
O{ course, if there is disagreement among the family,
evidence of bad faith or no family member available, the family
will not be relied on as the surrogate decision-maker. (52] The
next most likely approach will be the appointment of a guardian
or conservator. All states and the District of Columbia have
statutes that provide for such appointment, but they differ as to
whether they specify authority for health care decisions. Either
case law or statute will provide that the guardian may have the
authority to make decisions about the withholding or withdrawal
of life-sustaining treatment without court ratification or review.
[53] A few guardianship statutes do reserve "life-and-death''
medical decisions to the court.
Even in those states in which the court does not routinely
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require court approval, there will be disputed cases in which the
court will either approve a surrogate's decision or make the
treatment decision directly. When the treatment decision
involves the institutionalized patient who was never competent
the court may take an active role.
·
'
Over the last few years, there has been heightened interest in
the use of institutional ethics committees for resolving the
complex issues raised by foregoing life-sustaining treatment.
Such committees, with a diverse membership of physicians,
nurses, ethicists, other professionals, and the public, could
advise on various ethical and social considerations surrounding
treatment decisions. Although a few courts have looked to
prognosis committees to verify the medical condition of an
incompetent patient, case law and statutes do not grant ethics
committees authority to serve as the surrogate decision-maker
for the incompetent patient. [54] As ethics committees evolve
in more institutional settings, they should take on a more active
role in facilitating decision-making outside of the courtroom.
Generally, the trend has been to remove uncontroversial
cases from the court's jurisdiction. Yet a number of unnecessary
cases will continue to come to court. Based on an unrealistic
assessment of liability risk, health care providers will continue
either to seek the court's protection prior to terminating
tr~atment or force families to go to court to order them to honor
the family's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment on behalf of
the incompetent family member. Thus, an under~tanding on the
currect status of liability risk is in order.

CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY
A misunderstanding of the law and a fear of liability continue
to pervade medical practice in this area. To date, there has not
been one successful prosecution of criminal charges against a
physician or health care institution reported for withdrawing
life-sustaining treatment, including the removal of a feeding
tube. [55] Nor has there been a single case reported for civil
liability in which a physician was found negligent pursuant to a.
family's request to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining
treatment.
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However, there have been a few cases reported recently in
which the court has recognized a battery action for damages for
failure to abide by the wishes of the patient and/or family for
withholding or withdrawing treatment. The Ohio Court of
Appeals held that maintaining a comatose woman on a
respirator without her consent was actionable battery, [56] The
California court also recognized a cause of action, including the
payment of attorney fees (under its private attorney's general
statute) for a hospital's failure to remove a competent patient on
a respirator against his will and that of his family. [57] In the
Bouvia case, the California court maintained a cause of action
for damages based on her being forced fed against her will and
for attorney fees. [58]
In practice, it is not easy for a plaintiff to win such cases
against health care providers. The provider may appear very
sypathetic, it may be hard to prove knowing disregard for the
patient's wishes, and damages will be very difficult to assess.
The possibility of payment for attorney fees. however, may be
enough of an incentive to honor the right of the patient orm. his
surrogate decision-maker to refuse treatment.

UNRESOLVED ISSUES AND NEW QUESTIONS: HIGHUGHTS
Although legal and ethical trends have evolved over the last
decade, unresolved issues remain and new questions emerge. A
few are highlighted for future debate:
•
1. Accommodating Conflicting Beliefs

When a physician's personal or religious beliefs conflict with
a patient •s or surrogates's decision to terminate life-sustaining
treatment, the physician may transfer the patient to another
physician and be subject to liability for abandonment if
appropriate arrangements for transfer are not made in good
faith. Both common law and the living will statutes provide for
such an accommodation. Should the health care institution have
the same right when its objections are based on ethical and
religious principles and not be based on the unrealistic fear of
liability or convenience?
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To date, the courts are split on this "accommodation." The
Massachusetts Supreme Court only required that a hospital that
refused to remove a feeding tube based on its ethical principles
cooperate in the transfer of the patient to another facility. {591
In a similar case, a New York court ordered a ho~pital either to
remove the artificial feeding and hydration tubes from the
patient or assist in his transfer to his home or another facility.
The hospital refused to remove the tubes and transfer to another
facility was arranged. [60] ·
On the other hand, a California court held that a hospital
could not hide behind its religious principles in not removing a
patient from a respirator against his will. [61] In the Jobes
case, the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to force the
transfer of a nursing home patient whose family won the right to
have her feeding tube removed in contradiction to the nursing
home's policy written after her arrival. [62] In another New
Jersey decision, a lower court denied a hospital's request either
to have a severely neurologically impaired patient fed artificially, discharged or transferred to another facility. To force the
patient to be transferred, if she refused the feeding tube, would,
in the court's opinion, be to expose her to hardship and distress
in an extremely difficult time in her life. As unpleasant as it
might be for the staff to watch her die, their suffering could be
less than hers if forced to move. [63] A Colorado trial court,
when faced with a similar case, supported the right of a
competent patient over ,the institutional "conscience" of the
health care facility to have his feeding tube removed without
being transferred to another facility. [64]
In practice, it may often be difficult for the patient or the
institution to find another facility willing to accept the patient.
As more facilities address this issue in advance, they may set
policies that prohibit the removal of feeding tubes. If so, will
patients be able to exercise the rights that courts and legislatures have now granted?
2. Too Much Treatment?

On the other hand, there may be patients or surrogates who
want all treatment provided, even when the provider deems it
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medically inappropriate under the circumstances. If a patient or
his surrogate has the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, is
there a corollary right to demand that all means be utilized to
keep the patient alive? When can the healh care professional
and the institution say "NO MORE" without risking liability?
How will the standard of care emerge in the future for the hopelessly ill? Will a consensus emerge in which it is deemed unjust
in our society to provide unnecessary and inappropriate treatment (over and above supportive care) to those who have no
reasonable chance of recovery or return to a sapient life? [65]
To date, there is little guidance on this issue.
3. Qudlity of Life

How far are we willing to extend the right of a surrogate to
refuse treatment for a patient who is neither terminally ill nor in
a persistent vegetative state, but rather is chronically ill and
senile? Typically, this is the elderly patient often institutionalized in a nursing home. How can we quantify benefit and
burden for this patient? How much significance should we
attach to recovery, side effects, intrusiveness and severity of
treatment, and ability to cooperate in care? [66] And how will
such decisions be influenced by cost implications? How can we
continue to avoid making judgments about the ''social worth'' of
such patients?
Furthermore, what quality of life will the treatment of the
AIDS patient raise at different stages of the disease? Use of
antibiotics to cure infection may stabilize the patient for a while
until the next infection surfaces. How will the benefit/burden
ratio be calculated? What is deemed a life-sustaining treatment
and at what time in the course ofthe illness? AIDS dementia may
cause the patient to lose capacity temporarily to make decisions
about courses of treatment. Under the circumstances, when
should an advanced directive, if executed, become operational?
4. Redefining the Family and Appropriate Decision-Makers

It is well-established that the family is accepted as the
primary decision-maker for the incompetent patient. Yet the
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traditional definition of the family may not be appropriate in a
number of circumstances. For example, what about the gay
AIDS patient who becomes incompetent and has not appointed a
proxy decision-maker? Should not his lover of ten years be his
family? And what about the senile patient in a nursing home
who has no family?
Must one go to court to get a guardian appointed or are there
other alternatives to assuring that the interests of the patient
are being protected? Clearly, the patient's health care provider
should not act as the surrogate unless the patient had previously
designated the provider to act in that role. {67] Perhaps an
expanded role for the ethics committee or the ombudsman may
b~ appropriate? Another possibility to pursue is the "surrogate
committee'' to provide surrogate decision-makers for those
patients without capacity who lack family. [68] Whether the
"stranger" surrogate should have more limited discretion and
be subject to closer review than a family surrogate is still open
to question. Clearly, we must continue to develop and evaluate
mechanisms for protecting the rights of the incompetent patient
in the most effective and efficient manner.

CONCLUSION
The problems just highlighted must be put in perspective. It
was just a decade age thai the Quinlan case captured national
attention. Since then, legal and ethical foundations for the right
to forego treatment have become well-established. For the
competent patient, the right is relatively easy to apply. For the
incompetent patient, the law has moved toward the development of decision-making criteria and a presumption that the
family, and not the court, make treatment decisions on behalf of
the patient. State legislatures have also made much progress in
promoting the development of advanced directives and the
appointment of proxies for medical decisions. And the medical
community has recognized its duty to initiate discussions with
the patient and his family on the use or withdrawal of lifesustaining treatment. Hopefully, open dialogue will reduce the
risk of liability and increase prospective planning for medical
decision~making.
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